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JURISDICTION
Respondent Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association (the "Association")
agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in the Petitioner's Opening Brief.1
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A writ of certiorari was granted as to a single issue only:
Whether Deseret Diversified Development had the
authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants,
conditions and restrictions.
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Issue No. 1: Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 (2000); Jacobs
v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1994); Capital Assets Financial Services
v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000); Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v.
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989).
Issue No. 2: Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000); Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College, 114
Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949); Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah
2000).
Issue No. 3: Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Rule 8.2 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct.

1

Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, LLC, though
confusingly denominated as an association of property owners, is the owner of a single lot.
Perhaps to avoid confusion with other, similarly named entities, the lower Courts consistently
referred to it as "Petitioner," and that reference will continue here. Petitioner has a single
member, Axel Grabowski. (Opinion, fl 1.)
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner filed this action six years ago in an effort to avoid paying an annual
assessment of $175 made by the Association, a homeowners' association authorized by
30-year-old Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the Forest Meadow Subdivisions
recorded in Summit County in 1971 ("CC&Rs"). The action sought to nullify the CC&Rs,
which Petitioner termed "wrongful liens" against its property.
Petitioner is the owner of Lot 105 A in the Forest Meadow Subdivision, Plat D. It
acknowledges that Deseret Diversified Development ("Deseret") recorded the CC&Rs "to
provide for a mandatory home owners' association with power to make assessments and
impose liens" against a large tract of real property in Summit County, Utah. (R. 0023-26.)
Petitioner admits having both constructive and actual notice of the CC&Rs (R. 00167-68),
and further admits that it took title to Lot 105A "subject to easements, restrictions and right
of way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter."
(R. 00206.) Nevertheless, even though it has enjoyed the benefits of the Association,
Petitioner claims the CC&Rs are not binding as against its property.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Shortly after taking title to Lot 105 A, Petitioner filed a petition under the summary
procedures of Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq., seeking to
nullify a 1980 Lien Notice recorded by the Association. (R. 0001-0007.) Its effort was
rejected by the district court and Petitioner filed an amended petition asking for an order
2

declaring that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and that the CC&Rs were invalid.
On that basis, Petitioner argued that it should not be required to pay the Association's modest
annual assessments. (R. 0102-04.) Petitioner's request for summary reliefwas again denied,
but it was allowed to proceed with its claims on a non-summary basis. The parties later filed
cross-motions for summary judgment agreeing on the material facts and urging the trial court
to resolve these issues as a matter of law. (R. 00215-16; 217-19.) The district court entered
a lengthy ruling denying Petitioner's motion and granting Respondent's motion on multiple,
alternative grounds. (R. 00366-82.) Petitioner then filed a "Second" motion for summary
judgment that was also denied by the trial court. (R. 00490-92.)2
In April 2003, the district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent and against
Petitioner, effectively validating the CC&Rs. (R. 00493-97.) Thejudgment decreed (1) that
the CC&Rs were properly filed and properly encumber Lot 105 A; (2) that the burdens and
benefits of the CC&Rs run with the land and have done so for thirty years and, as a result,
Petitioner's challenge to the CC&Rs is untimely; (3) that since Petitioner bought its lot with
notice of the CC&Rs and acquired title subject to them, it would be inequitable for Petitioner
not to comply with them; and (4) that the CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice are not wrongful
liens against Petitioner's property. (R. 00493-97.)

2

The court ruled consistently in a companion case Paul Howard Peters vs. Pine
Meadow Ranch Home Association, which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Case
No. 200403 96-C A, in an unreported decision. This Court granted a writ of certiorari in that
matter, Case No. 20050806-SC, on the identical issue presented here. The Association's
brief in Peters is filed contemporaneously herewith.
3

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, after briefing and oral argument,
issued a unanimous opinion on June 30, 2005. The Court of Appeals held that the CC&Rs
had been adequately subscribed and imparted notice of their existence (Opinion, pp. 19-23),
that the facts submitted to the trial court offered sufficient evidence that Security Title held
the property in question in trust for interests that ultimately devolved to Deseret Diversified
Development, see id. at 24-30, that sufficient privity of estate existed that the CC&Rs run
with the land, see id. at 31-35, that Security Title ratified the recording of the CC&Rs by
joining in the subdivision of the lots and thereafter conveying the lots subject to the CC&Rs,
see id. at 36, that the doctrine of uniformity argued by Petitioner has not been adopted in
Utah (and that Petitioner did not allege facts sufficient to warrant an examination of the
doctrine), see id. at 37, and that the 1980 Notice of Lien filed by Respondent merely
republished the CC&Rs, see id. at 38.
Petitioner asked for rehearing on July 12, 2005 because of a mischaracterization by
the Court of the role of W. Brent Jensen as president of Security Title. The Court of Appeals
denied the Petition for Rehearing on July 20,2005, apparently because Security Title actively
participated in the development of the subdivision and thereby authorized the structure of the
development, regardless of who signed for it. This development structure included the
recorded CC&Rs, subject to which Security Title transferred title to the platted lots.
A Petition for Writ of Certiorari was then filed by Petitioner, seeking review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on eight separate grounds. The Petition was granted as to

4

a single issue only: "Whether Deseret Diversified Development had the authority as a
beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions." The issue, as
defined by this Court, assumes that Security Title held legal title in its capacity as trustee to
the land that later became Lot 105 A, and that Deseret held beneficial title to that land at the
time the CC&Rs were recorded. In its Opening Brief, however, Petitioner challenges the
basis for that assumption and wanders beyond the grant of certiorari, including arguments
on the nature of trusts generally, ratification and agency, and the statute of frauds. The
Association believes these arguments are in the nature of a plenary appeal, beyond the issues
fairly encompassed by the order granting certiorari.
Statement of Facts
L

The Association was established August 14, 1973, by Brent Jensen and

Vincent B. Tolmann to act as the owners' association for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions
located in Summit County, Utah. (R. 00244.)
2.

Petitioner is a Utah limited liability company established in December 1999 by

Axel Grabowski. (R. 0160-61.) He is its sole member.
3.

Petitioner is the owner of Lot 105 A, Plat D, Forest Meadow Subdivision, by

virtue of a 1999 Quit Claim Deed from Axel Grabowski recorded by the Summit County
Recorder's Office. (R. 0134; Opinion f 11.)

5

4.

Petitioner's chain of title for Lot 105A was described by the Court of Appeals

at paragraphs 2-11 of the Opinion. That sequence of deeds and dates is acknowledged by all
parties.
5.

Petitioner acquired title to Lot 105A "subject to easements, restrictions and

right of way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter."
(R. 00207-08.)
6.

Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret were the developers of the

Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions in Summit County. (R. 00244; Opinion^ 3,
4, 5, 36.)
7.

Over twenty years ago, this Court described Brent Jensen and his companies

as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. See Leo M.
Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d211,212 (Utah 1981) (noting that in 1970
"Brent Jensen, a defendant, bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for development
purposes . . . . By January 1, 1975, 380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by
Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch
subdivisions").
8.

On July 22, 1971, Deseret recorded the CC&Rs, entitled "Reservations and

Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch," dated July 8, 1971, as entry No. 113593,
Book No. M32, Pages 251-254, in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County.
(R. 0023-26; Opinion % 4.)

6

9.

The CC&Rs were signed for Deseret, a Utah Corporation, by W. Brent Jensen,

its president. (R. 0023-26.) They plainly recite that the CC&Rs are established by Deseret,
"the owner of the foregoing described premises . . .." (Id.) (Emphasis added.)
10.

A couple of weeks later, on August 19, 1971, Deseret rerecorded the original

CC&Rs as Entry No. 113788, Book No. M32, Pages 590-93, in the of the office of the
County Recorder of Summit County, to correct an obvious but incorrect description of the
property. (R. 00475-478; Opinion^ 19.) The re-recorded CC&Rs simply corrected the legal
description from "Township 1 South" to "Township 1 North," and reflect the original
recording information along with the new. Much of the property that later became the Forest
Meadow Subdivision Plat D is contained in the property described in the CC&Rs.
(R. 00475-78.) A copy of the rerecorded CC&Rs is attached as Addendum 2 to Petitioner's
Brief.
11.

Though recordation of the CC&Rs imparts constructive notice of their

contents, See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000), Petitioner had actual notice of
them. (R. 00167.)
12.

Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D ("Plat D") was recorded with the Summit County

Recorder on August 9,1972. It was recorded by the stated "owners" of the property, Deseret
Diversified and Security Title Company, Trustee. (R. 00179; Opinion Tf 5.) A copy of the
Forest Meadow Plat D is attached as Addendum 3 to Petitioner's Brief.

7

13.

Plat D was signed by the beneficial owner, Deseret (by W. Brent Jensen,

President, and Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as Trustee.
(R. 0179.) Each party's signature on the plat acknowledges the ownership status of the other.
14.

Plat D confirms that it was "recorded and filed at the request of Deseret

Diversified Development Corp." (Id.)
15.

Deseret Diversified was also identified as the subdivider of the land and as an

owner in the Subdivider's Note, contained on the recorded Plat D. (Id.)
16.

The Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was initially formed as

the owners' association for the Forest Meadow subdivisions, including Plat D. (R. 00244.)
On May 30, 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was merged into the
Association by shareholder vote. (R. 00244.)
17.

Since the merger in 1978, the Association has operated as the homeowners'

association for all of the 800 plus lots, homes, and cabins in the several Pine Meadow and
Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00245; Opinion ^j 13.) It has conducted its business,
including exercising architectural control and active enforcement of the CC&Rs since its
creation.3
18.

Lot ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, including

the obligation to assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the Association's annual

3

Thus, the validity of the CC&Rs was never "moot," as suggested by Petitioner.

(Brief, p. 11.)
8

meetings. (R. 00245.) Access to lots within the Association's boundary, including Lot
105 A, can only be had through the Association's roadways. {Id.) Petitioner has attended and
voted at Association meetings and has utilized the roadway improvements and other benefits
provided by Respondent.
19.

To confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs recorded against

various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, Respondent republished those
CC&Rs in the form of the 1980 Lien Notice recorded on July 25,1980, as Entry No. 168800
in Book 163 at Page 152 of the records of the Summit County Recorder, and therein gave
notice of an address at which confirmation of payments of any assessments could be
obtained. (R. 00247; Opinion % 38.)
20.

In response to questions raised in part as a result of this lawsuit, on April 3,

2003, Respondent recorded the Clarification of Notice of Lien, as Entry No. 653634 in Book
1523 at Page 1809, confirming that the 1980 Lien Notice was intended merely to republish
the existing CC&Rs and other encumbrances of record and did not to create a new
encumbrance on the property. (R. 00247; Opinion ^ 38.)
21.

The Association operated with funds collected by the Pine Meadow Special

Service District until Summit County determined to dissolve the Special Service District in
1999. Upon dissolution of the Special Service District, Summit County conveyed to the
Association an exclusive easement (concurrent with the rights of the local water company)
for the control, operation, construction and maintenance of the roads in the Pine Meadow and

9

Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 258.) The Association has since assessed its members,
under the authority of its articles of incorporation and by-laws, to pay for the maintenance
and insurance of the roads and open space, and for other Association purposes. Petitioner
has refused to pay any assessment made by the Association.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Deseret acted in the role of the developer in imposing, through recorded CC&Rs, a
structure for a future owners' association, subdividing the land by recording an ownership
plat, creating the owners' association, and obviously arranging the sales of the lots it created.
Its authority to do so is amply confirmed by the active collaboration of the legal title holder,
Security Title Company, Trustee.
First, Deseret declared its status as an owner in the recorded CC&Rs.

It then

proceeded with the preparation, approval, and recordation of the plat to create the Forest
Meadow Plat D subdivision. Its roles as owner, subdivider and the parity that recorded the
plat are expressly stated on the face of the plat. Equally clear on the face of the plat is the
approving participation of Security Title, Trustee, which signed with Deseret as an owner.
At the time the plat was signed and recorded, Security Title had notice of the CC&Rs, which
were already of record. Significantly, the signatures of Security Title and Deseret were
simultaneously notarized by Deseret's attorney, Lee Rudd, the same individual wrho notarized
and recorded the CC&Rs. Security Title thereafter conveyed title to the Plat D lots created
by Deseret to Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest subject to restrictions and reservations

10'

appearing of record. All of this contemporaneous evidence confirms that Deseret acted with
authority in imposing the CC&Rs.
Petitioner counters by arguing that the law of trusts prohibited Deseret's actions and
that the Court of Appeals effectively overturned the law of trusts by affirming the Trial
Court. Petitioner is wrong. The ruling of the Court of Appeals was carefully tailored to the
uncontested facts of this case. It made no broad pronouncements and overturned no
precedent. Deseret, the beneficial title holder, never purported to convey fee title to the
property and did not create a competing chain of title. It did not attempt to convey the
Trustee's interest in the trust assets. To the contrary, Deseret acted within the scope of its
beneficial interest as the developer of the property and effected the planned conditions and
subdivision of the land. Security Title confirmed Deseret's authority to so actbyjoining with
Deseret in the execution and recording of the plat and then conveying the lots created
thereby subject to the restrictions of record.
The other technical issues raised by Petitioner, including ratification and the statute
of frauds are not within the issue defined by the grant of the writ of certiorari.4 Even if they
were properly raised herein, however, Petitioner has not shown that the Court of Appeals
erred. Security Title's joinder with Deseret in the platting process as an owner, and its
subsequent conveyance of the lots created by Deseret subject to the previously recorded

4

Petitioner acknowledges that its ratification argument is beyond the scope of
certiorari. (Opening Brief at pp. 31-32.)
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restrictions confirms that Deseret either acted within its existing authority as developer or
that Security Title ratified Deseret's prior actions. There is no other logical construct of the
uncontroverted facts.
Finally, the Association is constrained to note the unjust and scandalous criticism of
the Court of Appeals and, in particular, of Judge Greenwood, in the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari and in Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief. These derogatory references are
improper, unsupported and unsupportable, and far beyond the limits of decorum established
by applicable standards. As a result, Petitioner's briefs should be disregarded or stricken by
the Court, and attorneys' fees should be assessed.
ARGUMENT
I.

DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT HAD THE AUTHORITY
TO IMPOSE BINDING COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PROPERTY IT WAS DEVELOPING.
The pervasive role of Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret, in the

development of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions is obvious from
recorded documents that establish and govern the subdivisions. Though the documents may
be less than elegant by today's title standards,5 they describe an incontestable course of a
phased development, with Security Title holding legal title, while Jensen's interests, holding
beneficial title, acted as the developer of the various phases. Jensen, through successive

5

The Court of Appeals suggested that Jensen's approach to documentation was
"cavalier." Opinion, f 29.
12

entities that apparently reflected different investor groups, recorded covenants, prepared and
recorded plats, constructed roads and a water system, and sold and conveyed lots. While the
original records that described the relationship between Security Title and the Jensen
interests are no longer available, the object and result of this collaborative effort are readily
apparent in the 800-lot community they created.
That Jensen acted with authority and the acquiescence of Security Title is conclusively
confirmed by the joinder of Security Title with Deseret in executing Plat D as owners and
by Security Title's subsequent conveyance of the lots (including Lot 105) subject to the
restrictions and reservations that have been of record for 30 years. (Opinion, ^f 6.) For these
and other reasons, the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, and they
did so on alternative bases.6
Petitioner persists in its attacks on the CC&Rs by self-defining a number of
incongruous legal pigeonholes, and then complaining that it cannot fit this fact situation
neatly within them. Petitioner posits a number of hypothetical issues, but cannot reconcile
them with the phased development of real property in which a watchful trustee took an active
and approving role. The difficulty with Petitioner's position lies not with the underlying

6

The Court of Appeals, for instance, did not disturb the Trial Court's findings
that Petitioner's challenge to the CC&Rs is untimely, and it would be inequitable for
Petitioner to avoid compliance with the CC&Rs where it took with notice of them and enjoys
the benefits provided by the Association. (R. 00380 - 381; 00494.) These points are not
embraced in the issue as to which certiorari was granted and will not be further addressed
herein.
13

facts but with the impractical and hypertechnical legal analysis it attempts to employ.
Petitioner's lengthy parade of parentheticals and hypothetical horribles ignore both history
and logic, and demonstrate a refusal to recognize the fundamental fact that this land was
developed by Jensen and his companies, including Deseret. Simply put, had Jensen and
Deseret not had the authority to develop Forest Meadow Plat D, Lot 105 would not exist. In
other words, Petitioner acquired its land, and therefore its standing herein, only by virtue of
the acts of the very developer whose authority it now challenges. The illogic of its position
doomed Petitioner's effort before the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, and Petitioner
will not be able to escape it here.
A.

Deseret's Authority to Impose the CC&Rs is Confirmed by the
Records Furnished by Petitioner,

The facts material to this action are nol in dispute. The parties acknowledged both
that the recorded documents placed before the Trial Court were accurate copies and that they
comprise all of the relevant, recorded documents. Both parties urged the Trial Court to
resolve the case by Summary Judgment. Those records stand as ample evidence of Deseret's
authority on two separate bases: (1) they establish time-honored presumptions of authority
that Petitioner has not, and cannot, rebut; and (2) they stand separately as evidence of that
authority and of the pattern of the development process followed by Deseret and Security
Title.
Precisely to address situations where a party may seek to challenge documents long
after memories have faded and evidence has been lost, Utah law establishes a specific
14

statutory presumption that "recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded] document
. . . are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). A recital by definition is "[a]
preliminary statement in a contract or deed explaining the background of the transaction or
showing the existence of particular facts." Black's Law Dictionary 1276 (7th ed. 1999).
When recitals and other statements of fact are included in a recorded document, the
presumption of their truth "may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence."
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concerning the presumption in
section 57-4a-4 (l)(j) that delivery of a deed occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time
between the date on the document and the date of recording).7
The CC&Rs recite that Deseret was the "owner" of "the South half of Section 22,
Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which will consist of all the
lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions within this area," (R. 00475-78), a portion of
which ultimately became Lot 105A. The CC&Rs were signed by W. Brent Jensen, as
President of Deseret. Id. By statutory presumption, this statement in the recorded CC&Rs
establishes that Deseret Development had an ownership interest in the property at the time
the 1997 CC&Rs were recorded. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). Petitioner
offered no contrary evidence.

7

Forest Meadow's argument that the CC&Rs are invalid under the Utah
general law of trusts because the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber
specific properties held by the trustee in trust are addressed below.
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The CC&Rs further state that "the reservations and restrictive covenants herein set
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or occupying any
lot...." (R. 00475-78). The neighboring Pine Meadow CC&Rs similarly provided that "all
of the properties . . . . shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the following easements,
restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the value and
desirability of, which shall run with, the real property." (R. 00181-90). This pattern was
followed by Deseret and its successors in the development of the multiple plats that created
the 800 Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow lots that are members of the Association. The
intent and effect of the declarations is evident both in their language and their effect. In fact,
the lands were subdivided and sold, and have at all times been governed by the CC&Rs.
That the stated goal of protecting the value and desirability of the lands subject thereto has
been met is presumably evidenced by the fact that Petitioner was attracted to the area.
B.

Deseret's Actions Were Consistent With Its Beneficial Interest

Covenants affecting land may be imposed by a person or entity authorized to do so.
That authority may be based in an ownership consistent with the interest expressed in the
covenants. This Court, in Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776
P.2d 618,629 (Utah 1989) confirmed that covenants which run with the land "must be based
in some interest in land." (Emphasis added.) The precise nature of the interest upon which
such covenants must be based was not specified. Rather, the Court held: "[T]o touch and
concern the land, a covenant must bear upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of the
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kind that the owner of a estate or interest in land may make because of his ownership right."
Id., at 623 (citations omitted). Deseret possessed such an ownership right.
The nature of the relationship between Security Title, the legal title owner, and
Deseret, the beneficial title holder, is easily inferred. The recitals in the record documents,
and the phased development of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, amply
confirm Deseret's role as developer of Forest Meadow Plat D. Its beneficial interest in the
land was that of a developer with the right to develop the land subject to the ultimate
satisfaction of the financial or other requirements imposed upon the trustee by the trustor.
This was the obvious nature and purpose of Deseret's beneficial interest in the land. We
need not speculate or indulge in hypothetical about what Deseret might have done with the
land because we know the course of its development activities. Deseret's course of
development is evident in the records of the Summit County Recorder and in the large,
contiguous community of subdivisions it left behind. No less evident is the fact that Security
Title, as Trustee, acknowledged and confirmed the authority of the beneficial title holder by
joining in the platting of the land with knowledge of the CC&Rs previously recorded by
Deseret, and by Security Title's subsequent conveyance of the platted lots subject to the
CC&Rs.
This history is made plain by the detail of the uncontroverted evidence furnished to
the Trial Court. As noted above, Lot 105 A was created by the plat that established Plat D
of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivision. (R. 00135). Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, which
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was recorded with the Summit County Recorder on May 6, 1976, clearly recites that the
"owners" of the property were Deseret and Security Title. The Owners' Declaration
indicates, in relevant part:
Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known
as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT U D" do hereby
dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown
on this plat as intended for public use.
(R. 00135). The plat was then signed by Deseret (by W. Brent Jensen, President, and Lee
Ann Hunter, Secretary), and by Security Title Company as Trustee, all as owners.
(R. 00135).
The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides additional
evidence that Deseret was the beneficial owner of the property being subdivided. The note
reads:
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of the
roads and streets or rights of way to public use. It is intended
that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the
subdivider, Deseret Diversified Development, Inc.—and shall
be completely maintained by said owners.
(R. 00135). The Surveyor's Certificate provides additional evidence and proof that Deseret
was an owner at the time Plat D was recorded. This certification provides, in relevant part,
"I, Lynn D. Gottfredsen, do hereby certify . . . that I have, by authority of the owners,
subdivided the tract of land shown on this plat & described below into lots & streets (private
roads), to be hereafter known as FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT 'D.'" (R. 00135).
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Security Title, as Trustee, by its signature clearly agreed with and ratified the recital of
Deseret's ownership interest.
This evidence is consistent with the import of the presumption, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-4a-4(i)(j), that Security Title held legal title as a "Trustee" on behalf of its principal and
that the beneficial title holder was Deseret - the party that signed and recorded the 1971
CC&Rs. (R. 00135). Utah Law is clear to the effect that:
There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal
title possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial
interest. . . . Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is
held purely for the benefit of another.
Capital Assets Fin. Serv. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9, ^ 17, 994 P.2d 201.8
No evidence suggests other than that Deseret was the beneficial owner of the property

8

Petitioner complains about the Court of Appeals' analysis of Capital Assets.
At page 21 of its Opening Brief, Petitioner claims, "No reasonable person could have drawn
the Court of Appeal's [sic] holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the
range of 'innocent mistake' or even 'negligent mistake.'" In other words, Petitioner accuses
the Court of Appeals of making a deliberate misstatement, of intentionally violating the Code
of Judicial Conduct. The accusation is unfounded and scandalous.
While the Court may have been more explicit in the parenthetical explanation
of the import of Capital Assets in the citation at f 36 of its opinion, Capital Assets does
support the general conclusion for which it was cited. In discussing the purposes of the
judgment lien statute in Capital Assets, this Court stated, "a judgment lien attaches to a
debtor's beneficial and equitable property interests, even if the debtor has no record title."
Capital Assets, 2000 UT 9 at f 15 (citations omitted.) Indeed, "a judgment lien will n ot
attach to a debtor's 'bare legal title' in property because such a debtor holds no equitable or
beneficial interest in the land." Id. Here, and under the authorities cited in the next
argument, a beneficial title holder may indeed encumber its interest in the property.
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that ultimately became Lot 105A at the time the CC&Rs were recorded.

Petitioner

acknowledges that "the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument" (Opening
Brief, p. 24) and then complains that it is not able to locate a copy three or four decades later.
Petitioner here acknowledges that it cannot meet its burden of overcoming the presumption
that the statements in the CC&Rs are true. Petitioner also tacitly acknowledges something
more significant: that none challenged the authority of Deseret to record the CC&Rs at the
time the property was being developed. Petitioner has offered no evidence to suggest that
the trustor or the trustee challenged or in any way disagreed with the recording of the CC&Rs
by Deseret, or with Deseret's authority to do so. To the contrary, Security Title joined in the
platting of the property and subsequently conveyed title to the lots created by Deseret. The
trustor, presumably, accepted payment for the land and vanished from the record.
The Court of Appeals found that all traditional requirements of privity necessary for
the enforcement of the CC&Rs exist in this case. Opinion, f 35.9 This analysis is instructive,
because the same elements that established privity are those that confirm Deseret5s authority
to develop the property and to record the CC&Rs. Beyond that, however, "substance should

9

The trial court held consistently and stated in the alternative, "even if there was
no vertical privity, as a matter of equity, the court agrees with [the Association] that prior
predecessors in interest have treated the covenants as covenants that run with the land and
so must [Petitioner]. A challenge to these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and
must be barred." (R. 00380). Clearly, in Utah, a party must prevail in claims on the strength
of his own title and not on the weakness of another. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hard Money Funding,
Inc., 87 P.3d 734,790 (Utah App. 2004). Again, there are not competing chains of title here.
All agree that Petitioner owns Lot 105A. The only question is whether Petitioner is bound
by the CC&Rs recorded against it.
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prevail over technical form so that a homeowner's association which had no interest in the
property at all could sue to enforce a covenant." Flying Diamond Oil Corporation, 776 P.2d
at 628 n. 13 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
II.

TO THE EXTENT THE TRUST AND OTHER ISSUES BRIEFED
BY PETITIONER ARE FAIRLY ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE
SINGLE ISSUE AS TO WHICH THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WAS GRANTED, THEY DO NOT REQUIRE A DIFFERENT
RESULT THAN THAT REACHED BY THE LOWER COURTS.

Petitioner's primary "pigeonhole," its response to the issue as posited in the writ of
certiorari, is to challenge the existence *of the trust, assume that it had "spendthrift"
limitations, and then dispute the authority of those who acted for it. (Opening Brief,
argument 4.) However, the issue the parties were directed to brief assume the existence of
the trust described by the Court of Appeals, and that Deseret held a beneficial interest
thereunder. Petitioner's arguments disputing the existence of a trust are thus not properly
before the Court. "Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' decision
and is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petitions." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v.
Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998). "Only questions set forth in the petition or fairly
included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). "This
Court's grant of a petition of certiorari does not allow a second plenary appeal." Debry v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). "Issues not presented in the petition for certiorari,
or if presented, not included in the order granting certiorari and fairly encompassed within
such issues, are not properly before the court on the merits." Id. (Emphasis added.)
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As the issue framed by the Court presupposes the existence of the trust, the focus of
argument must be on whether the rights and powers of a trust beneficiary may include the
authority to impose binding CC&Rs on trust property. Petitioner is precluded from calling
into question the existence of a trust.
Assuming that Petitioner's arguments are properly before the Court, the Association
notes that Deseret never purported to convey fee title to the land subject to the trust. It did
not create a competing chain of title and the Association acknowledges Petitioner's title to
Lot 105 A. Title to the trust res, in other words, remained with Security Title as Trustee until
the land had been platted and Security Title was in a position to convey the individual lots
developed by Deseret and Security.
Petitioner argues that, as beneficial owner, Deseret had no power of disposition.
(Opening Brief, p. 17.) Petitioner makes that statement with no knowledge of the terms of
the trust and in disregard of Deseret's obvious role as developer of the property. As noted
above, trustees hold title for the benefit of others. They have no beneficial interest. The
beneficial ownership of the property in question here, both in fact and under the issue stated
by the Court, was held by Deseret. Petitioner argues that, as beneficial owner, Deseret had
no power to act with regard to the property. Petitioner is wrong.
As a general rule, "the beneficiary of a trust has the power to transfer his interest."
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 132 (1959). This rule "is applicable to transfers of a part
of the beneficiary's interest as well as to transfers of the whole of his interest." Id. § 132
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cmt. c; see generally George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 188 (Rev. 2d
ed., 2005) ("In the absence of provisions in the trust instrument or a statute to the contrary,
the beneficiary may alienate his interest as freely as he might a legal estate or interest."
(footnotes omitted)), and the cases cited therein.

Furthermore, "the interest of the

beneficiary may also be devised, mortgaged, or encumbered." Bogert, The Law of Trusts and
Trustees at § 188 (footnotes omitted).
This principle was recognized in the early Utah case, Cronquist v. Utah State Agr.
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949):
"According to the great weight of authority, . . . where the
instrument creating the trust contains no express words of
restraint and nothing in (sic) on its face declaring that the
purpose thereof is to provide a support for the beneficiary and
to furnish him with the comforts of life, and where it requires
that the revenue arising from such trust shall be paid directly to
the beneficiary without any direction concerning its application
and without any discretion being vested in the trustee as to the
time or amount of such payments or the purpose to which they
shall be applied, such revenue may be anticipated, or assigned
by the beneficiary or by proper proceedings subjected to the
payment of his debts."
Id at 284 (alterations in original) (quoting Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 245 S.W.421,422
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1922)).
The general right of the beneficiary to alienate its interest in the trust res is
reaffirmed by the Utah Uniform Trust Code (the Trust Code).10 See Utah Code Ann.

10

The Trust Code is relevant to the trust in the present case. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-7-1103(l)(a) ("Except as otherwise provided, this chapter applies to: (a) all trusts
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§§ 75-7-101 to -1201 (Supp. 2005). For example, the Trust Code defines "[bjeneficiary" as
a person that "has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent"; or
"in a capacity other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust property."
Id. § 75-7-103(b). "[P]ower of appointment" is not defined by the Trust Code. However,
the phrase has a long history at common law where it has been stated that "the essence of
such a power is that it gives to the donee the power to cause some person to receive less of
the subject property and another person to receive more." In re Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d
617, 619 (Utah 1987); see generally 62 Am. Jur. 2d Powers ofAppointment, Etc. § 2 (2005)
("The power of appointment has been defined simply as the power to dispose of
property . . . ."). While a power of appointment may not be directly involved here, by
defining a "beneficiary" as one who "holds a power of appointment," the legislature
implicitly acknowledged a trust beneficiary's general power to dispose of its beneficial
interest in the trust res.
In exception to the general rule, the trust instrument may limit the beneficiary's power
of transfer, generally through a "spendthrift provision,"11 but the intent to restrain the

created before, on, or after July 1, 2004 .. . .").
11

For an example of a spendthrift provision, see In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d
1238, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Both wills contained the following spendthrift clause:
No beneficiary of my estate shall have any right to alienate, encumber, or hypothecate his or
her interest in said estate or the income therefrom, nor shall such interest of any beneficiary
be subject to claims of his or her creditors or liable to attachment, execution, or other process
of law.").
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beneficiary's power of transfer must be clearly shown.12 See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 283.
In the present case, there is no indication that the trust was subject to a spendthrift provision
or other restraint on the beneficiary.13 Accordingly, because such a restraint must clearly be
shown, see, Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 283, Deseret had a general power of disposition of its
beneficial interest.
Cronquist is also instructive as to the extent Utah law permits a beneficiary to alienate
its beneficial interest. In Cronquist, the trustor died testate in 1927, leaving a substantial
estate in real and personal property, some of which, including College Farm, "was by the
terms of the will left to the Cache Valley Bank Company as trustee, to hold in trust for twenty
years." Id, at 281. The beneficiaries of the trust were the trustor's three children, one of
whom was the plaintiff to the instant action. Id. On November 9, 1944, "before the
termination of the trust estate," Id. at 282, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with Utah
State Agricultural College (the college), whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell to the college
his "undivided one-third interest in the College farm, for $10,000, and at the same time [the]
plaintiff[] executed a quitclaim deed to the land." Id. at 282. The deed was deposited with
12

Similar restraints include a "discretionary trust," which places distribution at
the discretion of the trustee, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-504 (Supp. 2005), or a trust for
support or maintenance.
13

Indeed, such restraints may not have been valid at the time this trust was
executed and wholly operated. Although generally discussing spendthrift trusts, the
Cronquist Court refused to recognize their validity. See Cronquist v. Utah State Agr.
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949) ("This opinion is not to be construed as a
holding by implication that spendthrift trusts are valid in Utah to any extent. As to that
question we express no opinion.")
25

the trustee, for delivery to the college "upon approval of the agreement by [the college's]
Board of Trustees." Id. The quitclaim deed was later delivered to the college, and recorded
on November 20, 1944. The trustee continued to hold the land in trust until the trust was
terminated in 1947 (at the end of the twenty-year trust period) "and the trust assets [were]
conveyed to the beneficiaries." Id.
The plaintiff commenced suit "to have [his] contract with, and deed to [the college]
declared null and void." Id. The college counterclaimed "for specific performance of the
contract and that title to an undivided one-third of the lands in question be quieted to it." Id.
The district court ruled against the plaintiff and in favor of the college See id.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trust was a spendthrift trust, and that
therefore the plaintiff could not "anticipate his interest therein, nor could he alienate it in the
fashion attempted to be done here." The college, for its part, insisted that the trust was not
a spendthrift trust, "and that the contract and deed executed by [the] plaintiff[] are in all
respects binding. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting
title to the property in the college. Id. at 285.
This reasoning is applicable here, which involves a trust similarly free from restraint.
The Court of Appeals confirmed that the CC&Rs are covenants that run with the land. See,
Forest Meadow Ranch Prop. Owners Ass 'n, L.L.C. v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass 'n,
2005 UT App 294,T|39, 118 P.3d 871. It does not follow, however, that imposition of
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CC&Rs, which are in the nature of a contract between future owners of the land, is an
alienation of the fee title to the land.
CC&Rs act as a contract established by a prior owner that affects property and is
construed under principles of contract law:
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber
subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property
owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore,
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of
construction as those used to interpret contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000) (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants
§ 1 7 0 (1995)) (additional citations omitted) See also Holladay Duplex Management
Company, L.L.C., v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105-106 (Utah App. 2002) (noting deeds and
restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts); Canyon Meadows
Home Owners Association v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148,1151 (Utah App. 2001) (same).
As noted above, the CC&Rs must "be of the kind that the owner of an estate or interest in
land may make because of his ownership right." Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 623. Since
the nature and purpose of Deseret's beneficial interest was that of a developer, the imposition
of CC&Rs and the platting of the land was entirely consistent with its interest in the trust.
Even if the imposition of CC&Rs could be deemed an alienation of an interest in the trust
property, it was a far more modest alienation than that involved in Cronquist, where the
beneficial owner was permitted to quitclaim his one-third interest in College Farm prior to
the termination of the trust.
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There is further authority for the right of a beneficial owner to alienate or otherwise
affect its interest in trust property. Absent a spendthrift provision, creditors and assignees
of the beneficiary enjoy a general right to attach or encumber the beneficiary's interest in the
trust res. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-501 (Supp. 2005). In fact, the law considers the
authority of a creditor of the beneficiary to involuntarily encumber the beneficiary's interest
equal to the beneficiary's own authority to voluntarily encumber or alienate that interest. See
id. § 75-7-502 (making a spendthrift provision preventing transfer valid only "if it restrains
both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest."). Given this equality of
rights, it would seem to make little sense to hold that a beneficiary's creditor may encumber
the beneficiary's interest in the trust, whereas the beneficiary could not.
Petitioner recognizes that "trust beneficiaries of non-spendthrift trusts have authority
to dispose of their interests in the trusts," but contends that this is "not the power to dispose
of trust property." (Opening Brief, p. 18.) In support of this claim, Petitioner cites (without
explanation or quote) George T. Bogert, Trusts 132-42(6th ed. 1987). However, this
statement is not clearly supported by Bogert. In fact, in his treatise, Bogert states: "The rules
of construction with regard to equitable estates are generally the same as those regarding
corresponding legal interests, and the beneficiary of a trust will normally take an equitable
estate having rights and incidents similar to one owning a corresponding legal estate."
George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 182 (Rev. 2d ed., 2005). This
reasoning comports with the action taken by the Utah Supreme Court in Cronquist, wherein
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the court permitted the beneficiary to convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in College Farm.
See Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College, 201 P.2d at 282, 285.
Petitioner also argues that the beneficiary has no power of disposition because the
"long established rule" in both Utah and the United States at large, is that "the trustee has
exclusive control over trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the
trust instrument." (Opening Brief, pp. 16-17.) In support, Petitioner cites In re Estate of
Flake, 2003 UT 17,112, 71 P.3d 589; Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah
1997); and Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869
(Utah 1981). However, Petitioner quotes only a part of the rule in his brief. The actual rule
from these cases states that the trustee has:
exclusive control of the trust property, subject only to the
limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument, and "once a
settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust
property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly
reserved to him in the trust instrument."
Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17 atf 12 (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co., 632 P.2d at 872).
When the entire rule as stated in these cases is considered, it becomes clear that the
exclusivity of control bestowed upon the trustee is vis-a-vis the settlor, and not the
beneficiary.

Indeed, none of the cases cited by Petitioner involve disputes over a

beneficiary's disposition of property. Rather, Continental Bank involved the settlor's
disposition of trust property, see Continental Bank & Trust Co., 632 P.2d at 872; Flake
concerned the revocation and modification of a trust, see Estate ofFlake, 2003 UT 17 atffl[9,
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13-22; and West involved a challenge by children, as contingent beneficiaries of a revocable
intervivos trust, to their father's power "either as sole trustee or surviving settlor . . . to
convey the property out of the trust to himself and his wife Marilyn West after his first wife
Hazel West [the children's mother] died." Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d at 352, 353.
The present case, by contrast, involves the active beneficiary of a trust. In such cases, as
noted, the general rule is that such a beneficiary can dispose of and encumber his beneficial
interest in the trust res. See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 282, 285.
III.

PETITIONER'S CRITICISM OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
SCANDALOUS AND UNJUST. AS A RESULT OF THESE ATTACKS
ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT, PETITIONER'S BRIEF MAY
APPROPRIATELY BE STRICKEN AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
SHOULD BE ASSESSED.

In the six years since Petitioner filed this action, it has availed itself of the benefits of
Association membership, while variously blaming the Association, its counsel and the Courts
for the continuing existence of the Association and community attributes it represents. The
pursuit of its claims to an expense and extent entirely disproportionate to their import may
be Petitioner's right, but even that right must be exercised within established bounds of
civility and decorum. "Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind
has no place in an appellate brief and is of no assistance to this Court in attempling to resolve
any legitimate issues presented on appeal." State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986); see
also Advanced Restoration, LLC v. Priskos, 2005 UT App 505 n. 13. This caution was
issued in a case involving a pro se defendant; it applies with much greater force to a
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defendant represented by an experienced attorney and instructor of attorneys. Rule 24(j) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires briefs filed in this Court to be free from
scandalous matters and provides that briefs containing such materials may be disregarded or
stricken.
Throughout this litigation, Petitioner has refused to acknowledge the possibility that
it might be mistaken, and that the development process that created Lot 105 A also resulted
in the creation of a community association of which Petitioner is a member. Petitioner has
instead persistently blamed others for the fact it has not prevailed. At various stages of this
action, it has accused opposing counsel of bad faith and challenged the standing of the
Association to defend itself against Petitioner's claims. Thus far, the Association has chosen
to ignore these insinuations and has attempted to focus instead on the relevant facts and law.
The Association still believes that the proper focus herein should be on the merits of
the dispute. However, the derogatory and baseless charges of intentional judicial misconduct
made in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and in the Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief
are so scandalous and inappropriate that, consistent with the admonition in the comment to
Rule 8.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct to defend judges and courts unjustly
criticized, the Association feels constrained to object and bring them to the attention of this
Court.14
14

The charges appear to arise from a factual misstatement by the Court of
Appeals when it stated that the Forest Meadow Plat D plat had been signed on behalf of
Security Title by W. Brent Jensen rather than by Leo D. Jensen. (Opinion, n. 2 and ^f 30).
That error was the stated basis for a Petition for Rehearing which was denied not because of
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Petitioner's repeated criticism of the Utah Court of Appeals and, in particular, Judge
Greenwood, is offensive and inappropriate. In particular, the Association directs the Court's
attention to the hostile and demeaning tenor of the pointed accusation that Judge Greenwood
intentionally fabricated evidence to establish factual support for a pre-conceived result. This
and other wholly unsupported charges of bias, prejudice, and intentional misconduct (i.e.,
"This was no innocent mistake") are made at pages 5-8 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
The charges are again sarcastically invoked at pp. 16-17 of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
Petitioner did not exhaust its emotion with the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. At
pages 21 - 22 of Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief, Petitioner renewed its attack.
Referencing the import of Capital Assets discussed in footnote 7, above, Petitioner
sarcastically accused the Court of Appeals of intentionally misstating the holding of that
case.15
These public attacks on the integrity of the Court of Appeals and, in particular, Judge
Greenwood, are baseless and inappropriate. They are made in violation of Rule 8.2 (a) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits false or reckless public statements
bias or corruption, as argued by Petitioner, but because the misstated fact was obviously
immaterial to the Court's decision.
15

"No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of Appeals' holding from
the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of 'innocent mistake' or even
'negligent mistake.' The truth is sometimes a matter of degree - as when the defendant
claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded when he accidentally shot his wife - six
times." Opening Brief at 21.
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concerning the integrity of a judge, and they certainly violate Standards 1 and 3 of the
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. These requirements are consistent with a lawyer's
obligations under Rule 3.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and its interpreting
comment. Hostile and derogatory references are simply not appropriate. See Cook;
Advanced Restoration, L.L.C. v. Priskos, 126 P.3d 786 , 2005 UT App 505, fn 13.
Petitioner's Briefs violate Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
such a clear extent that they should not be considered by the Court and attorneys' fees should
be assessed.

CONCLUSION
Deseret had the authority to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions on
the lands of its phased development. Its authority to so act within its beneficial interest as
developer of the property is confirmed by the recitals in the recorded documents, by the
confirming and ratifying conduct of Security Title, Trustee, by the lack of objection by the
trustor and any of the other owners of lots in the community it developed over a 30-year
period, and by the authorities generally permitting a beneficiary to alienate or encumber its
beneficial interest in a trust. Petitioner acquired title to a lot created by Deseret and cannot
now complain that Deseret lacked authority to develop the lot. The Opinion of the Utah
Court of Appeals should therefore be affirmed.
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In addition, Petitioner's briefs should be disregarded or stricken by the Court because
they contain derogatory and scandalous accusations of judicial misconduct not supported in
this record. Attorneys' fees should therefore be assessed against Petitioner.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of February 2006.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

<g?£7^
EDWIN C. BARNES
WALTER A. ROMNEY, JR.
Attorneys for Respondent /Appellee
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 57. Real Estate
*ii Chapter 3. Recording of Documents
*S Part 1. General Provisions
•*§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice—Change in interest rate—Validity
document—Notice of unnamed interests—Conveyance by grantee

of

(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed
by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying
with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of
location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying
with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of
their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document
provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the
parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names
the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person
with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person
not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free
and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as
grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and
describes the real property subject to the interest.
Laws 1977, c. 272, § 54; Laws 1985, c. 159, § 7; Laws 1988, c. 155, § 14; Laws
1989, c. 88, § 8; Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 85, §
4, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 11, eff. July 1, 2001.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2000; C.L. 1907, § 2000;
1933, § 78-3-2; C. 1943, § 78-3-2; C. 1953, § 57-3-2.
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
Title 57. Real Estate
CHAPTER 4A. EFFECTS OF RECORDING
Chapter 4A. Effects of Recording
-•§ 57-4a-4. Presumptions
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions
real property affected:

regarding title to the

(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting
to execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and
executed are the persons they purport to be;

the

person

on

whose

behalf

it

is

(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding
document and the date of recording;

any

lapse

of

time

between

dates

on

the

(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described
by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an
organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his
authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized
applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and

under all

(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a
principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
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U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on
the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and
the grantor received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth
so that the joinder of the nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections
75-2-201 through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed
pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor
acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the execution of the
document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document
purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the
person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed.
Laws 1988, c. 155, § 22; Laws 1989, c. 88, § 11.
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4, UT ST § 57-4a-4
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session
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